Vlora Airport is not a runway, but a test of the state’s sustainability over public property
The Vlora International Airport was promoted by the government as a key investment for the economic and tourism development of southern Albania—a bridge connecting the coast with international routes, facilitating tourist flows, and relieving pressure on Tirana Airport. However, what initially seemed like major infrastructure news quickly turned into a complex challenge: legal, environmental, and financial issues have put the project at significant risk.This editorial analysis aims to dissect the key issues that have made this project a paradigmatic case for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) challenges in Albania, and to propose critical considerations for entrepreneurs, the state, and the public.
Concession, partners, and initial dynamics
In April 2021, the Albanian government signed the concession agreement with the Mabetex-YDA-2A consortium, for an investment of approximately €103.9 million.Within the initial structure, Mabetex (owned by Behgjet Pacolli) held 50%, the Turkish company YDA held 48%, and the Kosovar 2A held 2%.From the start, it was decided that the government would assume revenue guarantees: if the airport failed to reach expected traffic, the state would compensate the operator according to the contract terms.However, from the beginning, two fundamental concerns were already apparent:– The project is located in a protected natural area (Narta Habitat, Vjosa Delta), with potentially irreversible ecosystem impacts.
– The project was assessed as financially risky, as traffic projections were optimistic and the value of state guarantees was increasing.
Thus, from the initial contracts, investors had a “safety net”—state guarantees that could cover shortfalls if traffic did not meet projections.In the following years, the COVID-19 pandemic delayed construction, but by 2021, work resumed and the project moved to the ground.
YDA’s exit and share transfers
A key moment occurred when YDA, the Turkish partner, withdrew, initiating a change in the shareholding structure. Reports indicate that YDA sold 40% of its shares to Mabco Constructions SA (owned by Behgjet Pacolli) for a nominal sum of €4,450.This transfer gave Mabco almost 98% of the shares.This situation raised alarms that the project’s financial structure was not sustainable with initial capital alone, relying mainly on loans Mabco obtained from banks and other institutions, often using the airport itself as collateral.Another problematic aspect: there are claims that the notarial contract for the shareholding change (e.g., that 2A would hold 47%) was signed but not registered in the Central Business Registry, leaving room for conflicting claims and legal disputes.Media reports confirm that the conflict between Pacolli (Mabco) and Valon Ademi (2A) escalated: Ademi seeks recognition of his investments and the claimed shareholding portion, which is alleged to have been denied.This dynamic of share transfers and unenforced contracts is one of the main reasons the project has entered legal and financial deadlock.
Environmental objections and institutional legitimacy
One of the strongest criticisms of the airport has been its impact on Narta and the Vjosa Delta, internationally protected areas (IBA, KBA). Environmental organizations have warned of irreversible damage, disruption of bird habitats (flamingos, herons), and the risk of bird strikes with aircraft.Citizens and activists consider the project a violation of natural protection policies, favoring short-term economic interests.The government, on the other hand, argues that the airport is built on a former runway and that the impact can be managed with mitigating measures.A key issue: many environmental contracts and impact studies have not been made fully public, a lack of transparency often highlighted by media and activists as leaving the project vulnerable to accusations of political or economic manipulation.Institutionally, this environmental challenge, coupled with procurement disputes, casts doubt on the legitimacy of the entire process, and the project’s environmental sustainability and institutional legitimacy remain fragile in the face of conflicts of interest and opacity.
Corporate crisis, shareholder conflicts, and 2025 investigations
In October 2025, the Tirana Court suspended decisions made by the company shareholders of “Vlora International Airport – VIA” and blocked any actions planned for the General Assembly, linking this to the unregistered sale of 49% of shares from Mabco to 2A on April 3, 2025.Voting rights of the main shareholder (Mabco) were also suspended until the contract is registered.Simultaneously, the Tirana Prosecutor’s Office opened criminal investigations against three individuals: Behgjet Pacolli, his brother Emin Pacolli, and Nelson Çela (former administrator of Mabco in Switzerland). Charges include fraud with severe consequences, document forgery, and computer-related offenses.In the midst of this crisis, the newly appointed administrator withdrew days after taking office, a move interpreted by media as pressure and incapacity to operate in a conflictual environment.Previously, administrator Valon Lluka was abruptly dismissed, highlighting tension between the two main shareholders.This series of events, such as judicial suspension, criminal investigations, dismissals, and withdrawals indicates that the project is not only in financial crisis but has entered a criminal and operationally delicate phase.
From financial risk to sovereignty risk
A concerning thesis circulating in recent reports is that the use of sophisticated financial and corporate structures could place airport control outside Albanian legal jurisdiction.Vox News analysis shows that Pacolli used financial models in Switzerland and Luxembourg to create “compartments” in securitization instruments, where assets are legally isolated. If such a compartment is liquidated under Luxembourg law, assets transfer to investors holding the compartment bonds, and no claims can be made by creditors outside that circle.If proven, this scheme could make it impossible for the Albanian state to regain control, as the acts and assets are no longer subject to Albanian jurisdiction.Reporter.net also mentions a loan of approximately €100 million allegedly obtained by Pacolli, used as a risk instrument that could result in the airport being transferred to a “phantom” investment fund in case of default.A further strategic concern arises from reports suggesting links to foreign interests, including potential Russian connections, making the project a matter of national security and airspace sovereignty, not just economics.
Diagnostic of project dilemmas
The Vlora Airport project, with its initial concession, partner exits, suspicious financial transactions, unregistered contracts, judicial suspensions, and complex international financing, goes beyond a mere business dispute.It reflects deep dilemmas regarding:– How public-private partnerships are built and managed in Albania
– The involvement of foreign actors
– The sustainability of institutional sovereignty in the face of global finance
Key dilemmas and risks
When analyzing the entire mosaic surrounding the Vlora Airport project—the initial concession, the exit of partners, the questionable financial transactions, the non-registration of contracts, the judicial suspensions, and the complex international financing schemes—a picture emerges that goes beyond a mere business conflict. It reflects deep dilemmas about how public-private partnerships are built and managed in Albania, how foreign actors are involved in them, and how resilient institutional sovereignty is in the face of global finance.
First, full publication of contracts and financial agreements. Transparency is the foundation of democratic legitimacy. Without the publication of contracts and financial documents, any debate remains in the dark and creates the perception of a secretive deal. Publication should include terms of revenue guarantees, to understand the fiscal exposure of the state; securitization clauses, which may transfer rights over revenues to foreign entities; notarial agreements for shares and loans, specifying who has actual control. Experience from EU countries shows that even when “trade secrets” exist, redacted versions of contracts are made public to ensure public oversight of PPPs. Without transparency, there is neither accountability nor guarantee of public interest.
Second, legal review of clauses allowing control transfer
One of the most dangerous points is the possibility that control could pass to a creditor in the event of default or financial non-payment.
If the contract gives the creditor the right to replace management or acquire shares, it amounts to a de facto privatization of public assets through financial instruments.
To prevent this, any clause allowing control transfer must receive parliamentary approval for strategic projects, and be reviewed by the State Attorney and Council of Ministers for compliance with national security law.This ensures that economic control cannot be transferred outside Albanian jurisdiction without explicit political consent.
Third, requirement for Independent Due Diligence.
In such contexts, an independent financial and legal audit is a protective tool for the state. An international team should analyze the actual cost of the project and its alignment with the initial economic plan; the sources of financing (creditors, funds, guarantees, real capital interests), and hidden risks in international structures (offshore companies, securitization).Audit results should be made part of public reporting and condition any new project phase, ensuring that the state acts on facts, not assumptions.
Fourth, environmental consultations and International Standards.
Beyond the financial aspect, the airport project faced opposition regarding its impact on the protected Narta area. Environmental study reviews should be conducted by independent experts, not contractors linked to the government and according to World Bank and EU standards for impact assessment with public participation for local communities. Applying these standards is not a barrier but a guarantee that the project is not penalized internationally for violating environmental norms.
Fifth, mechanism for Shareholder conflict resolution
Shareholder disputes have frozen the project a legal mediation mechanism, e.g., a joint arbitration panel with domestic and international lawyers, could resolve conflicts without paralyzing the project. In many EU countries, a fast-track arbitration framework exists for strategic PPPs, preventing work suspension until a final decision. Albania should develop such a mechanism to avoid strategic projects being blocked for years.
Sixth, strengthening regulatory and oversight bodies
Existing institutions, like State Attorney, Competition Commission, Bank of Albania, and Supreme Audit Institution (KLSH) should have expanded control powers for strategic projects; veto rights over agreements creating long-term fiscal obligations, and: mandatory public reporting for any contract involving state guarantees.This balances executive power and establishes real institutional oversight. The state should not merely sign agreements, it must safeguard and arbitrate the public interest.
Seventh, limited government guaranteesRevenue guarantees should be limited, transparent, and conditional.
For example, maximum guarantee should not exceed 10–15% of projected annual revenues and periodic review by the Ministry of Finance and KLSH for fiscal sustainability. Any excess should require parliamentary approval. This prevents fiscal capture, where the state is forced to cover private losses without a recovery mechanism.
Eighth, International Monitoring and Independent Partners
Since the project involves international financial structures, it is essential to include:
– International financial institutions (IFC, EBRD, EIB) as technical monitors;
– Donors or development banks enforcing high transparency standards;
– Mandatory public reporting every 6 months on financial and legal progress.
This model, used in countries lacking institutional trust, creates external oversight as a guarantee of impartiality.Finally, it must be acknowledged that an airport is not an ordinary business: it is infrastructure of national importance. It affects national security and airspace control, emergency management, and transport and civil defense policies. Therefore, it must be legally stipulated that no foreign or offshore entity may have operational control or veto rights over such infrastructure. If a foreign company is involved, strategic control must remain with the Albanian state or partners under Albanian jurisdiction.
In conclusion, the Vlora Airport stands at a crossroads between development and risk: it could become a motor of southern Albania’s economy if public control, transparency, and institutional responsibility are maintained. Otherwise, it risks becoming a financial experiment that undermines legal sovereignty.
October 2025 court rulings and ongoing investigations are not obstacles, but a test of the state’s legal strength. If control and transparency are prioritized, Vlora Airport can be a model of reform and economic integrity; if not, it will remain a symbol of lost sovereignty through opaque contracts. Vlora should be not just a runway, but a test of the state’s resilience over its own assets.